| FORUM | ARCHIVE |                    | TOTAL QUIZ RESULT |


  New Posts New Posts RSS Feed - Weapons of Imjin War
  FAQ FAQ  Forum Search   Events   Register Register  Login Login


Welcome stranger, click here to read about some of the great benefits of registering for a free account with us and joining us in our global online community.


Weapons of Imjin War

 Post Reply Post Reply Page  <12
Author
RollingWave View Drop Down
Janissary
Janissary


Joined: 29 Jul 2005
Status: Offline
Points: 33
Post Options Post Options   Thanks (0) Thanks(0)   Quote RollingWave Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 19 Jul 2011 at 08:28

Here's a list of major land battles in the first Imjin war and it's general description sorted by date.

 
1592
 
4/14-15  Bushan : The begining of the invasion so the Japanese overwhelm the Korean garrison at Bushan and it's nearby garrisons with relative ease though the garrison at Dongnae managed to last around half a day of fierce fighting.
 
4/28 ChungJu : The hastily assembled Korean army met the Japanese spearhead at the fields of Chungju, they attempted a cavalry charge but was foiled and badly defeated in the insueing battle. this Loss cuase the total collapse of the Korean defenses as many assembling forces were still enroute around the country but after this defeat most fell apart and never again massed into true army and the Korean court fled north upon news of this defeat.
 
After this essentially saw the complete collapse of the Korean defense as Seoul and PyongYang were both taken literrally without a fight.  though trouble also began for the Japanese as their lines were now stretched and resistent forces are rising everywhere, more over their navies began to get crushed by Yi Sun Shin.
 
7:? :  Haejungchang the Northern most Japanese army met against the Elite border troops of the Korean army (and basically the only remaining Korean regular army), this time the Korean cavalry did succeed in their charge but were driven back in the insuing melee and then defeated by a night attack.
 
7/17 PyongYang: The first Ming army attempts to retake Korea, at the point the Chinese were still rather confused on what happened and were also preoccupied with Rebellions elsehwere, the end result was them sending what was a small army of 5000 men under a minor general into Korea, he managed to get to PyongYang and even surprised the garrison there but were eventually defeated in the enusing stree battle  . his second in command was killed by arbeques.
 
10/5-10/10 Jinju: The South Western Province of Jelloa remained untaken and was also the base of Yi Sun Sin's navy, the Japanese attempt to take the province in October was foiled at Jinju on a very close call, the defenders were almost overwhelmed after 5 days and their commander was killed by a gunshot, however a small relieve army under a cleaver Korean insurgent leader tricked the Japanese into believing that he was actually a large relieve army and they decided to give up the siege.
 
 
 
1593
 
1/08  PyongYang : A full Ming army finally arrives in Korea and marched strait for PyongYang, where their superior firepower overwhelmed the Japanese force in a single day and retook the Northen Capital.
 
1/27  Byeokjegwan :After retaking Pyongyang and the major city of Kaesong the Ming forces marched towards Seoul, by then they were quite (over)confident and what happened was either some bad intellgence or bad judgement on the Ming commander part that made him decided to run ahead with just his elite cavalries to Seoul which he assumed / heard is in the process of being abandoned by the Japanese.
 
However that was not the case and instead he ran into a huge Japanese army around Byeokjegwan, he managed to fight his way out but took considerable losses.
 
 
 
This was basically the end of the first war, after this the Ming troops managed to retake Seoul without a serious fight (due to the Japanese running out of food for their large garrison.)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Back to Top
Sponsored Links


Back to Top
RollingWave View Drop Down
Janissary
Janissary


Joined: 29 Jul 2005
Status: Offline
Points: 33
Post Options Post Options   Thanks (0) Thanks(0)   Quote RollingWave Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 19 Jul 2011 at 08:34
Also, here's a picture of the administrative division of Korea during that time, it was divided into 8 provinces which should give you a better idea .
 
 
Of these 8, only Jeolla was largely untaken (though Koreans also still held most of Pyonsan despite losing PyongYang) during the first war, the second war was mostly contained within Gyeongsang .


Edited by RollingWave - 19 Jul 2011 at 08:37
Back to Top
RollingWave View Drop Down
Janissary
Janissary


Joined: 29 Jul 2005
Status: Offline
Points: 33
Post Options Post Options   Thanks (0) Thanks(0)   Quote RollingWave Quote  Post ReplyReply Direct Link To This Post Posted: 20 Oct 2011 at 07:28
Originally posted by lirelou lirelou wrote:


The quick Japanese conquest was due not to any failure of Korean arms, but rather serious flaws in the Korean command structure. First, the King's policy was to keep all generals in his capital (Seoul), where he could keep an eye on them. This meant that a general sent out to command his troops in combat was likely seeing them for the first time. Doubly important, they were seeing him for the first time. Compare this to the feudal Japanese Army, where lords and his vassals were leading men intimately know to them, with long years of civil strife behind them. Second, the King was quick to panic, and more interested in saving his own skin that in defending his nation. And finally, internal Korean politicking and rumor mongering was rife, leading to confusion and uncertainty in the Korean high command. The king accepted the reports he wanted to hear, without verifying their truth. Thus Admiral Yi was so easily disgraced by rival generals who sent heads from his battles back to the King with fictitious reports of victories.
 
This is the negative way to look at it yes, but the postive was that this system allowed for a longer stable politics with much less risk of internal rebellion, the Yi dynasty lasted for another wooping 300 years after this war.  (they had already esbatlished for close to 200 years by this time). This was basically the conclusion China came to as well, that most regime are more at risk from being taken out interally than externally. Thus keeping a tight lid on your own military at the expense of their capability was generally worth it.
 

Quote
As for the Turtle ships, they were not the world's first ironclads or modern ships. But then the Japanese Army that Yi was fighting was not the Imperial Japanese Army of the 19th Century. It was a feudal army whose 'divisions' were hardly the uniformly organized and armed battalions, regiments, and divisions of the IJA. They were well organized fighting bands, whose principle means of attack was to close with and destroy their enemies in hand to hand combat. By such means did one attain glory in feudal Japan. And the Samurai were to be found in the thick of the fighting. Yi noted this, and realized that the key to victory over the Japanese was to identify and kill their leaders, as doing so spread panic and shame among their followers. Thus his naval tactics were based upon standing off of the Japanese far enough to be out of range of their cannon, while raking their ships with his own. Then relying upon his archers to rain arrows upon the enemy ships, while the turtle ships got close enough to attack and board the Japanese commander's flag ship. Thus the spikes on the top deck, which were meant to defeat the inevitable Japanese boarding while the Turtle ship crews and parties directed their efforts against the senior Samurai and his primary subordinates.

Anyway, that's my recollection of Turnbull's book.
 
This is the general popular thesis, though it may not be totally correct, the Japanese were fairly pragmatic folks and the navy operators were usually not full Samurais anyway. so the whole concept that they were preferring boarding attack by choice is rather questionable. (for example in one of the well noted naval battles between the Oda and the Mori the Mori were said to have used many exploding bombs and fire arrows)  It should be noted that the drawings of Turtle boats we see today come from very late 18th century, there's a very real chance that is more fantasy than reality.and that the real "Turtle Boats" were simply more heavily reinforced version of the common Korean Panokeseon.
 
I've seen analysist that think that it's simply a combination of superior ship designs and Yi's superior knowledge of the local currents that resulted in the extremely lopsided results of the naval combat in this war. For one thing, almost all the Japanese battleships were not sail based, but completely oar powered. while the Panokeseon was both. obviously giving the Korean commander a signficant tactical edge IF he can exploit it properly
Back to Top
 Post Reply Post Reply Page  <12
  Share Topic   

Forum Jump Forum Permissions View Drop Down

Forum Software by Web Wiz Forums® version 11.10
Copyright ©2001-2017 Web Wiz Ltd.

This page was generated in 0.047 seconds.